In response to a critique of my North Korea position, which is detailed in this series:
http://www.capitalismcenter.org/Initium/10-19-02.htm
http://www.capitalismcenter.org/Initium/01-11-03.htm
http://www.capitalismcenter.org/Initium/01-12-03.htm
http://www.capitalismcenter.org/Initium/01-22-03.htm
http://www.capitalismcenter.org/Initium/03-11-03.htm
BB is Ben Bayer, whose critique can be found here.
JB is my inestimable self, being quoted by Mr. Bayer. (He referred to a dissertation chapter, so I don't think it's Dr. Bayer yet.)
JB: America's primary interest on the Korean peninsula lies in preventing North Korea from selling nuclear weapons to our more active enemies.
BB: Maybe it's half of the primary interest, but let's not forget that NK has ballistic missiles that can strike the West coast.
The North isn't going to nuke Seattle for fun—they would have some reason to nuke or threaten to nuke Seattle. The only plausible reasons are 1) as part of a strategy to conquer the South or 2) to deter or avenge a U.S. attack on North Korea's nuclear facilities. Both of those problems are much more easily managed than the risk of the North selling the weapons for cash to people who would nuke us or Israel for fun. That is why it is the primary threat from North Korea.
BB: Why doesn't John think we could remove the NK artillery threat to Seoul with a preemptive strike to their artillery positions, and then threaten to retaliate against Pyongyang if Seoul is targeted?
Because the North has too damn many artillery pieces within firing range of Seoul. By the time we hit them all, hundreds of thousands of SK's are already dead.
According to a site called sciscoop, (reliability unknown) an "administration official" says: "In the first hour of a war, North Korea could rain between 300,000 and 500,000 artillery shells onto metro Seoul and other points in South Korea..." Randall Parker of Parapundit gives the number of artillery pieces at 10,000.
http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/asia/Halloran111498.html
Details the war plan from 1998 for winning a war against North Korea.
This is the age of Google. Do a little research. Using Tracinski and Kurtz as your sources isn't very impressive. Neither has any particular military or foreign policy expertise, or has special knowledge through journalistic connections.
BB: Negotiation with a blackmailer is appeasement only if the blackmailer keeps his leverage." What the heck does that mean? Apparently that if NK gives up its nukes, then it's no longer in a position to blackmail us.
Exactly. Why is giving in to blackmail impractical? Because it invites further blackmail. If the instrument of blackmail is removed, the blackmail game ends.
BB: OK, that's great, but how do you get him to put down the gun?!?
By presenting him with two options: 1. Complying with your ultimatum, 2. A war which would destroy him. It helps if your proposal can be spun as something besides your enemy's surrender, making him more likely to choose option 1.
BB: Because we withdraw our troops, we'd be less likely to endanger SK by our retaliation?
Yes.
BB: Why, because if we remove our troops, NK will no longer see SK as a worthy target?
Yes. You are the Northern generalissimo. Would you rather fight the United States with South Korea as an anxious neutral desperately trying to mediate the conflict and avoid the collapse of the North, or the United States and South Korea at the same time?
BB: And of course, even a military withdrawal wouldn't mean SK would cease being our ally, and NK would know that.
Yes it would. And the North would know that. In reality, the South has already ceased being our ally. An ally shares (and percieves) the same strategic interests and coordinates actions to further mutual security. South Korea is a client, or protectorate, enjoying increased security because of the US as their pusallinimity reduces our freedom of action. Without US troops in Korea, the South remain neutral in a US-DPRK war to avoid the destruction of Seoul.
BB: Withdrawing our troops would only make NK's retaliation against the South more likely.
No, it makes a Northern attack on the South somewhat more likely. That's not our problem. I am an egoist.
BB: I agree that the destruction of Seoul would be horrible. But first I think it could be prevented by a preemptive strike against NK artillery positions,
Do you have any evidence for this? What basis do you have for thinking that? Just about everything I've seen on the issue says the opposite.
As for the issue of buying time, buying time is only appropriate if the situation will change in your favor in the time you buy. In my proposal, assuming that we start finding the evidence of the North's cheating in, say, the third year after the agreement, the following improvements have occurred:
1. North Korea has handed over what the US estimates as their current uranium and plutonium stocks to the US or the UN or the IAEA or the Girl Scouts or whoever. Their known nuclear plants are dismantled, concreted over, or what have you. Their nuclear program is limited to the facilities and materials they were able to conceal in this round of the confrontation.
2. US troops are not in South Korea where they can be easily attacked by North Korea.
3. The France of the Far East, South Korea, is no longer in any moral position to restrain the US from attacking the North.
4. As a bonus, Seoul should be out of NK artillery range.
BB: And by the way, the idea that multilateral negotiations are somehow better than bilateral ones is also ridiculous. What is the difference?
It's a way of keeping score, of tracking who is more desperate to resolve the crisis, which means who will give in to the other.
BB: And the question is: should we risk New York, or should we risk Seoul?
No, the question is how can we best reduce the risk to New York. There is no solution with zero risk of vaporizing New York.
http://www.capitalismcenter.org/Initium/10-19-02.htm
http://www.capitalismcenter.org/Initium/01-11-03.htm
http://www.capitalismcenter.org/Initium/01-12-03.htm
http://www.capitalismcenter.org/Initium/01-22-03.htm
http://www.capitalismcenter.org/Initium/03-11-03.htm
BB is Ben Bayer, whose critique can be found here.
JB is my inestimable self, being quoted by Mr. Bayer. (He referred to a dissertation chapter, so I don't think it's Dr. Bayer yet.)
JB: America's primary interest on the Korean peninsula lies in preventing North Korea from selling nuclear weapons to our more active enemies.
BB: Maybe it's half of the primary interest, but let's not forget that NK has ballistic missiles that can strike the West coast.
The North isn't going to nuke Seattle for fun—they would have some reason to nuke or threaten to nuke Seattle. The only plausible reasons are 1) as part of a strategy to conquer the South or 2) to deter or avenge a U.S. attack on North Korea's nuclear facilities. Both of those problems are much more easily managed than the risk of the North selling the weapons for cash to people who would nuke us or Israel for fun. That is why it is the primary threat from North Korea.
BB: Why doesn't John think we could remove the NK artillery threat to Seoul with a preemptive strike to their artillery positions, and then threaten to retaliate against Pyongyang if Seoul is targeted?
Because the North has too damn many artillery pieces within firing range of Seoul. By the time we hit them all, hundreds of thousands of SK's are already dead.
According to a site called sciscoop, (reliability unknown) an "administration official" says: "In the first hour of a war, North Korea could rain between 300,000 and 500,000 artillery shells onto metro Seoul and other points in South Korea..." Randall Parker of Parapundit gives the number of artillery pieces at 10,000.
http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/asia/Halloran111498.html
Details the war plan from 1998 for winning a war against North Korea.
This is the age of Google. Do a little research. Using Tracinski and Kurtz as your sources isn't very impressive. Neither has any particular military or foreign policy expertise, or has special knowledge through journalistic connections.
BB: Negotiation with a blackmailer is appeasement only if the blackmailer keeps his leverage." What the heck does that mean? Apparently that if NK gives up its nukes, then it's no longer in a position to blackmail us.
Exactly. Why is giving in to blackmail impractical? Because it invites further blackmail. If the instrument of blackmail is removed, the blackmail game ends.
BB: OK, that's great, but how do you get him to put down the gun?!?
By presenting him with two options: 1. Complying with your ultimatum, 2. A war which would destroy him. It helps if your proposal can be spun as something besides your enemy's surrender, making him more likely to choose option 1.
BB: Because we withdraw our troops, we'd be less likely to endanger SK by our retaliation?
Yes.
BB: Why, because if we remove our troops, NK will no longer see SK as a worthy target?
Yes. You are the Northern generalissimo. Would you rather fight the United States with South Korea as an anxious neutral desperately trying to mediate the conflict and avoid the collapse of the North, or the United States and South Korea at the same time?
BB: And of course, even a military withdrawal wouldn't mean SK would cease being our ally, and NK would know that.
Yes it would. And the North would know that. In reality, the South has already ceased being our ally. An ally shares (and percieves) the same strategic interests and coordinates actions to further mutual security. South Korea is a client, or protectorate, enjoying increased security because of the US as their pusallinimity reduces our freedom of action. Without US troops in Korea, the South remain neutral in a US-DPRK war to avoid the destruction of Seoul.
BB: Withdrawing our troops would only make NK's retaliation against the South more likely.
No, it makes a Northern attack on the South somewhat more likely. That's not our problem. I am an egoist.
BB: I agree that the destruction of Seoul would be horrible. But first I think it could be prevented by a preemptive strike against NK artillery positions,
Do you have any evidence for this? What basis do you have for thinking that? Just about everything I've seen on the issue says the opposite.
As for the issue of buying time, buying time is only appropriate if the situation will change in your favor in the time you buy. In my proposal, assuming that we start finding the evidence of the North's cheating in, say, the third year after the agreement, the following improvements have occurred:
1. North Korea has handed over what the US estimates as their current uranium and plutonium stocks to the US or the UN or the IAEA or the Girl Scouts or whoever. Their known nuclear plants are dismantled, concreted over, or what have you. Their nuclear program is limited to the facilities and materials they were able to conceal in this round of the confrontation.
2. US troops are not in South Korea where they can be easily attacked by North Korea.
3. The France of the Far East, South Korea, is no longer in any moral position to restrain the US from attacking the North.
4. As a bonus, Seoul should be out of NK artillery range.
BB: And by the way, the idea that multilateral negotiations are somehow better than bilateral ones is also ridiculous. What is the difference?
It's a way of keeping score, of tracking who is more desperate to resolve the crisis, which means who will give in to the other.
BB: And the question is: should we risk New York, or should we risk Seoul?
No, the question is how can we best reduce the risk to New York. There is no solution with zero risk of vaporizing New York.
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